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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
GEORGE K. THOMPSON and FRANK S.
MARKHAM, co-partnership doing business under the firm name and style of
THOMPSON-MARKHAM COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, WILLIAM M. KNERR, Chairman
and member of said The Industrial Commission of Utah, and 0. F. McSHANE and
FRANK A. JUGLER, members of said
The Industrial Commission of Utah, and
E. A. HODGES, State Metal Mine Inspector,
Defendants.

No. 6221

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, under a contract with the United States of
America, Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation,
are engaged in the construction of a certain tunnel known
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as the Alpine-Draper Tunnel, Salt Lake Aqueduct, which
forms a part of the project known as the Deer Creek Project, having for its purpose the conveyance and transportation of water from the Deer. Creek Reservoir in Provo River,
Utah County, for use by subscribers of water in Salt Lake
County. Said tunnel, when completed, will run from a
point in the vicinity of Alpine, Utah County, Utah, to a
point in the vicinity of Draper, Salt Lake County, Utah.
Said tunnel projects through the elevation separating said
points, and when completed, will have an approximate length
of 15,000 feet, and will be approximately seven (7) feet in·
diameter. Said tunnel will be a straight bore, and will be
lined and re-enforced with concrete and steel.
The tunnel is being driven for the purpose of conveying water, only; and not for the purpose of exploring for,
or discovering mineral values, or to develop or operate a
mine, and is not connected at all with any mining venture.
In the prosecution of said work, plaintiffs require their
employees to work eight hours per day at their place of
employment within the tunnel, and to change shifts at the
place of employment within said tunnel, and not at the
portal of said tunnel. The time consumed by the workmen
in going from the portal to the place of employment, and
returning therefrom to the portal, is not computed as a
part of said eight hour period.
Defendants claim jurisdiction under the eight hour law,
Section 49-3-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended
by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, to require plaintiffs to
work their employees not more than eight hours per day,.
said eight hours to be computed from the time said employees enter the portal of the tunnel, until they return to
said portal, and claim jurisdiction to enforce said eight hour
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

law as interpreted by said defendants, and threaten to institute numerous prosecutions against plaintiffs unless they
cease to work said employees not to exceed eight hours,
from the time they enter the portal until they return to the
portal of said tunnel. For the Court's convenience we set
out plaintiffs' petition as "Exhibit 1" and defendants' answer as "Exhibit 2." ·
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION INVOLVED
The question involved is, have plaintiffs the right to
permit and require their employees to work eight hours per
day at their place of employment within said tunnel, exclusive of the time required in going from the portal of said
tunnel to the place of employment, and returning from the
place of employment to the portal of said tunnel.
ARGUMENT
THE ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF PROIDBITION SHOULD
BE MADE PERMANENT BECAUSE,
1. Section 49-3-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as
amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, has no application to a tunnel such as the one being driven by plaintiffs. Said act applies only to underground mines or underground workings connected with mining.
2. Said Section is a penal statute, and must be strictly
construed, and will be interpreted as being limited only to
such classes of employment as come clearly within the terms
of the act.
3. If Section 49-3-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
as amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, applies to
a tunnel such as plaintiffs are driving, the act violates SecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions 1, 3, 7, and 24 of Article one of the constitution of
Utah, and the 14th Amendment of the constitution of the
United States.
I.
THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT HAS NO APPLICATION TO A TUNNEL SUCH AS THE ONE BEING
DRIVEN BY PLAINTIFFS.
The act which plaintiffs are charged with violating,
Section 49-3-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended
by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, reads as follows:
"49-3-2. A DAY'S WORK-MINES AND SMELTERS. The period of employment of working men in
smelters and all other institutions for the reduction or
refining of ores or metals; shall be eight hours per day,
and the period of employment of working men in all
underground mines or workings shall be not more than
eight hours per day, such eight hour period shall be
computed from the time men go underground until
they return to the surface, except in cases of emergency
where life or property is in imminent danger; provided,
however, when underground hoists or pumps are in continuous operation, hoistmen and pumpmen employed
on such hoists or pumps may be permitted to be underground not to exceed eight hours and thirty minutes.
Any employer who violates any of the provisions of
this section is guilty of a misdemeanor."
The Constitution, Article 16, deals with the general
subject of labor.
Section six (6) of that Article is as follows:
"Sec. 6. (EIGHT HOURS A DAY'S LABOR ON
PUBLIC WORKS.) Eight hours shall constitute a
day's work on all works or undertakings carried on or
aided by the State, County or Municipal governments;
and the Legislature shall pass laws to provide for the
health and safety of employees in factoi·ies, smelbm;
and mines."
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The framers of the Constitution gave a mandate to the
Legislature to provide for the health and safety of employees in factories, smelters and mines.
That mandate is specific; there was no general mandate
to the Legislature to pass laws to provide for the health
and safety of employees in all underground workings. Underground workings, not connected with mining, were not
included in the mandate of the Constitution, any more than
was farming or cattle raising.
The first legislature of Utah, in 1896, (Chapter 72,
Laws of Utah, 1896, at Page 219) enacted a law entitled,
"An act regulating the hours of employment in underground
mines, and in smelting and ore reduction works," as follows:
"Section 1. The period of employment of working
men in all underground mines or workings shall be
eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency where
life or property is in imminent danger.
"Section 2. The period of employment of working men in smelters and all other institutions for the
reduction or refining of ores or metals shall be eight
(8) hours per day, except in cases of emergency where
life or property is in imminent danger.
"Section 3. Any person, body corporate, agent,
manager or employer, who shall violate any of the provisons of Sections 1 and 2 of this act, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor."
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, interpreted
the above mentioned act in the cases of State of Utah v.
Holden 14 Utah, 71, 46 Pac. 756 and State. v. Holden
14
.
Utah, 96, 46 Pac. 1105.
The first mentioned case was Habeas Corpus. Plaintiff was charged with employing a workman in underground
mining more than eight hours per day, in violation of Section 1 of the act.
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The second case was appeal. Defendant was charged
with employing a workman in his concentrating mill, for
the reduction of ores, more than eight hours per day, in
violation of Section 2 of the act.
In the first mentioned case, the Court said, at Page
95 of the 14th Utah Reports:
"The section of the statute whose constitutionality
is involved in this case includes all employees and employers engaged in working underground mines. None
are omitted who may be subject to the peculiar conditions that attend such mining. The provision of the
state constitution quoted makes it the duty of the legislature to 'pass laws to provide for the health and safety
of employees in factories, smelters and mines.' And we
are not authorized to hold that the law in question is
not calculated and adapted in any degree to promote
the health and safety of persons working in mines and
smelters. Were we to do so, and declare it void, we
would usurp the powers intrusted by the constitution
to the lawmaking power."
In the second mentioned case, the Court said, at Page
98 and 99 of the 14th Utah Reports:
"The people of the state, in their constitution, made
it mandatory upon the legislature to 'pass laws to provide for the health and the safety of the employees in
factories, smelters and mines .... ' The law in question
is confined to the protection of that class of people
engaged in labor in underground mines, and in smelters
and other works wherein ores are reduced and refined.
This law applies only to the classes subjected by their
employment to the peculiar conditions and effects attending underground mining and work in smelters, and
other works for the reduction and refining of ores.
Therefore, it is not necessary to discuss or decide
whether the legislature can fix the hours of labor in
other employments."
We submit that the 1896 statute was enacted in purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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suance of the constitutional provision, Article 16, Section 6;
and had for its purpose, and its sole purpose, the fulfillment
of that mandate. That it was intended only to apply to
the industries named in the constitution, to-wit, factories,
smelters and mines. The Supreme Court of this state, so
interpreted the act. At Page 83 of 14th Utah Report, in
commenting on the constitutional provision, the Court said:
"The second clause of the Section commands the
legislature to pass laws 'for the health and safety of
employees in factories, smelters and mines.' This provision must be regarded as an expression of the will of
the people of the state with respect to the subjects and
objects of legislation named in it; .... Any law adapted
to the preservation of the health or safety of employees
in factories, smelters, or mines is within the scope of
this provision. The law must be connected with some
of the objects named, and calculated to effect that purpose. If it is not so connected and adapted, the court
has the right to hold that it is not within the scope of
the provision."
Appeals were taken from the decisions in the Holden
cases heretofore mentioned to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and that court, in the case of Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U. S. 366; 42 L. Ed. 780; 18 Sup. Ct. 383,
quoted approvingly from the decisions of the Utah Court,
and at Page 389 (18 Sup. Ct. Rep.) used the following language:
"The enactment does not profess to limit the hours
of all workmen, but merely those who are employed
in underground mines, or in smelting, reduction or refining of ores or metals."
The first legislative enactment of the eight hour law
(Laws 1896) was interpreted by the Supreme Court of this
state in October 1896, as applying only to underground
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mines, and the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the law in conformity with the decision of this court.
The legislative department of the State of Utah must
be presumed to be familiar with the interpretation placed
upon the language "underground mines or workings" by
this court.
In Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898, under Title 36,
(LABOR), Chapter 2 (EIGHT HOUR LAW) Section 1337
entitled "In Mines and Smelters," reads in part as follows:
"The period of employment of working men in all
underground mines or workings, and in smelters ....,
shall be eight hours per day .... "
In Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, the subject under
consideration is found in Title 43 (LABOR), Chapter 2
(EIGHT HOUR LAW), Section 1337, which reads in part
as follows:

"(1337.) IN MINES AND SMELTERS. The period of employment of working men in all underground
mines or workings, and in smelters .... , shall be eight
hours per day .... "
This subject is found in Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917,
under Title 58 (LABOR), Chapter 3 (EIGHT HOUR LAW),
Section 3667, which reads in part as follows:
"3667. ( 1337.) IN MINES AND SMELTERS.
The period of employment of working men in all underground mines or workings, and in smelters .... , shall
be eight hours per day .... "
This subject is again found in Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, under Title 49 (LABOR), Chapter 3 (EIGHT HOUR
LAW), Section 49-3-2, which reads in part as follows:

"49-3-2 Id. IN MINES AND SMELTERS. The
period of employment of working men in all underSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ground mines or workings, and in smelters .... , shall
be eight hours per day .... "
It will be observed, that the Title of Chapter 59, Laws
of Utah, 1937, is "Eight Hour Law," and the caption of the

amended Section is "A DAY'S WORK-MINES AND
SMELTERS."
It is significant that in every statute regulating hours

of labor, from the enactment in 1896 to that in 1937, that
the words "underground mines or workings" appear identical in each enactment.
No clarifying amendment has been made by the legislature to extend the meaning of the term. Nor has there
been one change in the language used, indicating that the
legislature intended it to apply to any underground workings_ not connected with mining.
There is a strong presumption, that the legislative department must have concurred in the interpretation placed
upon the statute by the judicial department, otherwise, over
the intervening period of 43 years, that department would
have made clear its intention to apply the eight hour law
to underground workings not connected with mining.
It would have been simple indeed, had the legislature
desired to enlarge the scope of the law as enacted in 1896
to have used appropriate language for that purpose.
Had the legislature intended to make the law applicable to other undergro~nd workings it would not have repeated the identical language which the court had theretofore interpreted as applicable only to mines.
The meaning and application of the statute in question
must be considered in light of the judicial construction
placed upon the words "underground mines or workings."
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This rule of construction is stated in 59 C. J. Sec. 613 in
the following language:
"When a statute has been construed by the highest
court having jurisdiction to pass on it, such construction is as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it orginally .... ;and when words have a wellsettled meaning, through judicial construction they
must be understood, when used in a statute, to have
that meaning, unless a different meaning is unmistakably indicated .... "
In a footnote to the above quotation in 59 C. J., the
case of Plaster & M. F. G. Company v. Juab County, 33
Utah 114, 93 Pac. 53 is cited. This court, at Page 119 of
the Utah Report said:
" .... In view that the decisions of courts are but
the reflection of the common understanding with respect to particular things and the terms used in any
indpstry, business or calling, and are thus simply reduced to legal terms, we think that if the courts have
construed and applied what is meant by the terms
'mine' and 'mines,' then this meaning must control, and
especially so when the term is used in some statute or
constitution. This must be so for the simple reason
that the term will then have acquired a legal meaning,
which, unless the contrary clearly appears from the
context, must be deen1ed to be the meaning intended
to be applied to it in the law in which it is found."
The term "underground mines or workings" was declared by this court in the Holden cases to apply only to
underground mines. The re-enactment by the legislature
with the identical words as interpreted by the court must
be construed to apply only to mines.
The 1896 law was re-enacted in Revised Statutes 1898,
as Section 1337. And this court in the case of Short v.
Mining Co. 20 Utah, 20, after quoting Section 6 of Article
16 of the Constitution of Utah said, at Pages 26 and 27:
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"The act in question was enacted as a police regulation, and for the public good in the intere~t of public
policy. The experience in the past few years in the
business of mining and smelting and underground workings of mines shows that such business can no longer
be carried on with due regard to the safety and health
of those miners engaged in such business without special protection and restraint against the danger necessarily incident to such employment .... The employment of operatives when too long pursued, in smelters
and undergrotmd mines is considered by the legislature
as detrimental to the health of the employees .... It
was therefore considered that the employment of men
in smelters and underground mines, for a period of more
than eight hours per day, was detrimental to the health
of such persons."
Again, in the Short case, this court construed the language "underground mines or workings" as applying only
to underground mines. And again and again since that
decision the legislature continued to use the same language
in re-enacting the eight hour law.
If the statute in question is ambiguous reference to

the title, chapter and section headings of every revision
since the act of 1896, will disclose that the legislature was
regulating the hours of Labor in Mines and Smelters.
In Vol. 25 R. C. L. Sec. 267 at Page 1031 the author
says:

"It is, however, now the generally accepted view
both in England and in this country that the title of
an act is so far a part of the same that it may be resorted to where the meaning of the act is ambiguous,
for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning. As
said by Chief Justice Marshall in an early case: 'Where
the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of
notice and will have its due share of consideration.'"
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The word "workings" used in the act appears to have
been given no technical meaning by the legislature, and its
association with the other words of the act "underground
mines or workings," considered with the title of the section,
clearly indicates that such word has reference only to mines.
In Words and Phrases, 1st series, Vol. 8, Page 7522
appears the following:
"The term 'workings,' as used in the act relating
to mines and mining, includes all the excavated parts
of a mine, those abandoned as well as the places actually worked." P. & L. Dig. Laws Pa. 1894, Vol. 2, Col.
3110.
Technical words relating to an art, science or trade
when used in a statute dealing with the subject matter of
such art, science or trade, are ordinarily to be taken in
their technical sense, and will be so construed, unless the
context or other considerations show a contrary intent.
Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed.
Sec. 393.
When general words follow particular words, the latter
are given the meaning of the former.
Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed.
Sec. 424.
The application of the statute in question, to every case
in which work is, or may be carried on under ground would
reduce the act to an absurdity. Every sewer constructed
by a sewer district would technically place workmen under
ground. Even a man engaged in digging a well would be
engaged in an underground working used in the broad nontechnical sense, and if employed for that purpose, would
be subject to this law. Excavations for basements and exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cavations in connection with the construction of dams, under
an interpretation of the act as contended for by defendants,
may well be termed underground workings.
The Supreme Court of Nevada interpreted the Nevada
eight hour law which provided:
"The period of employment of working men in all
underground mines or workings shall be eight hours
per day."
In the case of Ex parte Boyce, 27 Nev. 299, 75 Pac 1,
after expressly approving the Holden cases and quoting at
length from them, the court used this language:
" .... The language forbids any person from working in underground mines, smelters or mills for the
reduction of ores more than eight hours per day ....
We may consider the protection of the health and lives
of that large portion of the people in this state who
delve in the earth in search of the precious metals that
help enrich the commerce of the world, and who there
and in the smelters and ore reduction works come in
contact with poisonous minerals, and breathe dust, foul
air, and obnoxious fumes and gases. In this connection
it should be remembered that the statute applies to
underground mines, and not to placer claims, or to men
working in the open above the surface."
II.

CHAPTER 59, LAWS OF UTAH, 1937, IS A PENAL
STATUTE AND MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED.
The Utah eight hour law being penal, will be interpreted as applying only to such classes of employment as
come clearly within the terms of the act.
Strictly construed, the act in question applies only to
underground workings connected with mines. In the case
of Ex parte Twing, Cal. 204 Pac. 1083, the court said:
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"But penal statutes must be construed to reach no
further than their words; no person can be· made subject to them by implication .... Haxfield v. United·
States, 197 U. s. 442, 49 L. Ed. 826."
A statute somewhat similar to the one in question was
construed by the Missouri court in the case of State v. Cantwell, 78 S. W. 569. That court said:

"It is insisted that this Act makes a distinction
between those working under ground in search of minerals and those working under ground. not in search
of minerals. This Act applies only to the class searching for minerals-after that class it makes no distinction. The Legislature doubtless realized the necessity·
of the provisions of this Act being made applicable to
those in search of minerals. The operations of mines
is a permanent business, lasting frequently for many
years. On the other hand the digging of a well or the
running of a tunnel is not to be classed as a business,
it is work that is completed in a comparatively short
time. Hence, there was absolutely no reason or necessity for including in the Act those who might in the
construction of railroads or other works incidentally
be required to work beneath the surface of the· earth."
By an Act of the Nevada Legislature of 1909; provision
was made for the office of Inspector of Mines, authorizing
investigations requiring certain regulatory measures with
respect to the operations of mfues.
In 1911 the Legislature added numeroul? provisions prohibiting certain things with reference to the operation of
mines. Section 22 of that act reads:
"Use of gasoline under ground is

prohibited~"

In 1931 the Legislature again amended the act and attempted to provide that all of its provisions should, "be extended to and imposed upon the owner, constructor, contractor~ subcontractor * * * and/or employee as the· case
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may be of all such tunnels, drifts, and other underground
excavations and workings where persons are employed at
work in this State."
In the construction of Boulder Dam, the contractor
used gasoline propelled trucks in underground excavations
in carrying out his contract with the United States. The
Mine Inspector sought to impose the provisions of the law
above mentioned, particularly the prohibition against the
use of gasoline under ground, to meet which the contractor
brought injunction.
In the trial of the case the defendant conceding for
the sake of argument that the 1931 act was unconstitutional,
contended that the original act of 1909 as amended by the
acts of 1911 and 1913, prohibiting the use of gasoline under
ground would be applicable to the work being carried on
by the contractor for -the Boulder Dam, but the court refused to adopt such contention, holding:
"Even if we assume that the title of the original
act creating the office of inspector of mines was sufficiently broad to justify the incorporation therein of the
amendments of 1911 and 1913 above referred to, and
that such amendments, did not violate the Constitution
of Nevada, it is clear that the intention of the Legislature was to control mining operations, and that the
provision that 'no gasoline should be used under ground'
except onder prescribed conditions must be held to apply to such operations only. The fact that similar operations, such as tunnel work, might be subject to the
same hazards as in the case of mines, does not justify
the application of the section prohibiting the use of
gasoline underground to something other than mines
if it were the intention of the Legislature in the first
place to apply the rule to mines only. If this matter,
of the applicability of the prohibition as to gasoline
underground to tunnels, is in doubt, under section 22
as originally added by am.endment in 1911, the amendment of 1913 (St. Nev. 1913, C. 224 (Comp. Laws Nev.
1929 4229)) to section 22, which made an exception to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
the general rule prohibiting gasoline underground in
favor of small gas engines, in mines at no greater depths
than 250 feet when appropriate provision was made to
take care of the exhaust as required by the act, clearly
shows that the intention was to confine the prohibition
of the act to underground operation in mines. That is
to say, the amended section 22 clearly applies to mines
only. We would not be justified in extending the meaning of the Legislature beyond its original intent as expressed in the act of 1909 as amended in 1911 and 1913,
.... " "Six Companies Inc. v. Stinson," 2nd Fed. Supp.
689.
Wyoming has strictly construed its eight hour day for
coal miners by holding that miners and laborers are not
covered by the words "any owners, lessees, or operators,
his or her agent, employees or servants." State v. Thompson, 15 Wyo. 136; 87 Pac. 433.
In Ex parte 1.\lartin (Cal.) 106 Pac. 235 the California statute (St. 1909 P. 279 C. 18) read:
"Section 1. That the period of employment for all
persons who are employed or engaged in work in underground mines in search of minerals, whether base or
precious, or who are engaged in such underground
mines for other purposes, or who are employed or engaged in other underground worldngs whether for the
purpose of tunneling, making excavations or to accomplish any other purpose of design, or who are employed
in smelters and other institutions for the reduction or
refining of ores or metals, shall not exceed eight hours
within any twenty-four hours .... etc."
The court commented on the case of Holden v. Hardy,
supra, and at Page 238 said:
"It may be questioned whether in view of the title
of the act, the limitation of hours applies to all underground work, or only to that performed in mines."
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In E.~ parte Martin (Cal.) 106 Pac. 238, a case involving the statute quoted above, the petitioner was charged
with having required a miner to work eight full hours at
the face of a drift in a mine in addition to the time necessarily oc<;upied in traversing the shaft, underground drifts
and tunnels, between the surface of the mine and the face
of said drift. The time so occupied in going to and from
the place of work was in excess of thirty ( 30) minutes.
Petitioner applied for a writ of Habeas Corpus and the
writ issued.
The court in its opinion said:
"We think the petitioner's contention that no violation of the act is here charged is correct and should
be sustained. The act provides that the period of employment of persons employed or engaged in work in
underground mines, etc., shall not exceed eight hours
in any twenty-four hours. The purpose of the act is,
as has been pointed out in the opinion in Cr. No. 1539,
the protection of the health of men working in underground mines. The injury to health which seems !()
have been apprehended is that which would be encountered by one subject to the strain of performing manual
labor under detrimental conditions. Giving to the
words of the act their ordinary and reasonable meaning, the limitation of time is to be construed as referring to the time when men are actually engaged in
work, not when they are going to or from their work.
There is nothing in the language of the act which would
justify a more restricted interpretation."
Nor can it be contended that plaintiffs' employees are
working in underground mines. The term mine has a very
specific meaning.
A mine is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as:
"A pit or excavation in the earth, from which ores
or other mineral substances are taken by digging."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
The same work defines mining as "The process or job
of excavating from earth the precious or valuable metals
either in their native state or in their ores."
If the act of 1896 interpreted by this court in the Holden cases, supra, applied only to underground mines, the act
of 1937 adding the words "such eight hour period shall be
computed from the time men go under ground until they
return to the surface," cannot be interpreted as any evidence of the legislative intention to extend the application
of the act to any employees except those engaged in underground mining.
The only reasonable interpretation of the 1937 act is
that it was a further exercise of the state's police power
with respect to the industry being regulated. Suppose that
the legislature, instead of the language used, had said:
"The period of employment of working men in
smelters and all other institutions for the reduction or
refining of ores or metals, shall be eight hours per day,
and the period of employment of working men in all
underground mines or workings shall be not more than
seven hours per day .... "
Clearly, this language c~uld not be intended as an enlargement upon the objects sought to be regulated. We
submit that the language used in the statute is a further
limitation upon the employment legitimately subject to regulation, and not an extension of the regulation to other employments.
In interpreting the 1937 Act, the court will observe
that it contains language appropriate only to underground
mines. The Act provides:
"When underground hoists or pumps are in continuous operation, hoistmen and pumpmen employed on
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such hoists or pumps may be permitted to be under
ground not to exceed eight hours and thirty minutes."
The court will take judicial notice that the workings
of plaintiffs afford no opportunity for hoists. Hoists are
appropriate equipment in underground mines, not in a tunnel such as the one under consideration. The very use of
that word would seem a potent argument that the Section
applies only to underground mines or underground workings connected with mines.
ill.

IF SECTION 49-3-2 REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH,
1933, AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 59, LAWS OF UTAH,
1937, APPLIES TO A TUNNEL SUCH AS PLAINTIFFS
ARE DRIVING, THE ACT VIOLATES SECTIONS 1, 3,
7, AND 24 OF ARTICLE ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND THE 14th AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES.
Our Constitution, Sec. 1, Article 1 declares:
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right
to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property; to worship according to
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protests against wrongs, and petition for redress
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that
right."
Sec. 3, Article 1 of our Constitution declares:
" The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the
federal Union, and the Constitution of the United States
is the supreme law of the land."
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Section 7, Article 1 of our Constitution declares:
" No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."
Sec. 24, Article 1 of our Constitution declares:
" All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation.''
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States declares:
"Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive anyJ>erson of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the law."
The validity of Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, as a
proper police regulation of plaintiffs' employees, does not
follow from the decisions in the Holden cases, supra. If
the purpose of the act is to extend the application of the
eight hour law to underground tunnels not connected with
mining, its validity is not established by the fact that the
act which is amended was held valid.
In 16 C. J. S. Section 195, Page 564, it is said:
" .... A statutory provision which is not a legitin1ate police regulation cannot be made such by being
placed in the same act with a police regulation, nor by
being enacted under a title that declares a purpose
which would be a proper object for the exercise of the
power. Also, the public purpose necessary to support
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an exercise of the police power is not imparted into a
legislative act merely because it supercedes an act
which had such public purpose."
We are not contending that a statute reasonably limiting the period of employment of all employees within the
state would necesarily be invalid. That question is not before the court. What we do contend, is that the inclusion
of plaintiffs' employees in the section limiting the period of
employment in underground mines is not evidence of the
validity of the regulation as to plaintiffs, .any more than
would be a provision that the period of employment of
working men in all underground mines, in all mercantile
institutions and on all farms shall be not more than eight
hours per day.
We are not unmindful of the difficulty of fixing the
limits within which the police power may be exercised, but
we do submit that it has limitations.
The court has always reserved to itself the power of
deciding whether a given statute is to be accepted as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state. In Mugler
v. Kansas 123 U. S. 623, at Page 661, the Supreme Court
of the United States said:

"It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends is to
be accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers
of the state. There are, of necessity, limits beyond
which legislation cannot rightfully go. While every
possible presumption is to be indulged in favor of the
validity of a statute .... the courts must obey the constitution rather than the lawmaking department, and
must upon their own responsibility, determine whether,
in any particular case, these limits have been passed.
'To what purpose' .... are powers limited, and to what
purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these
limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to
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be restrained .... The courts are not bound by mere
forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses.
They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn dutyto look at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the
public health, the public morals, or the public safety,
has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or
is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge
and thereby give effect to the constitution."
The bounds of the police power are not clear cut, and
the rules which limit its exercise under the constitution are
not easy of application, but rules have been announced.
This court, in the case of McGraw et al v. Industrial
Commission, 96 Utah 203, observed:
"This conception of the point at which the police
power is held in check by the due process clause steers
a course between the sophistry that rights are fixed
or immutable, and not to be determined in relation to
the public welfare, and the idea, rejected under our
system, that the legislature itself is the sole judge of
the extent of the police power."
To admit that the legislature is the final judge of the
extent to which it may go under the police power, is to
break down every constitutional guarantee and to substitute the legislature for the constitution and the judiciary.
Standards by which the constitutionality of a statute
enacted under the police power of a state is tested, require:
1. That the means must have a substantial relation
to the end.
2. That fundamental rights must not be infringed.
3. That the law in question must not be arbitrary,
unreasonable, or oppressive.
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It was said by Justice Holmes in Otis v. Parker, 187
U.S. 606, at Page 608:
"It is true, no doubt, that neither a state legislature nor a state constitution can interfere arbitrarily
\vith private business or transactions, and the mere fact
that an enactment purports to be for the protection
of public safety, health or morals, is not conclusive upon the courts."
In Eubank v. City of Richmond 226 U.S. 137 at Page
143, it was said that the police power:

"Has its limits and must stop when it encounters
the prohibitions of the constitution."
In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. City of Goldsboro,
232 U. S. 548 at Page 559, the court said:
" .... If .... there is wanton or arbitrary interference with private rights, the question arises whether
the lawmaking body has exceeded the legitimate bounds
of the police power.''

In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 at Page 319, the

court said:
" .... The legislative power of a state can only be
exerted in subordination to the fundamental principles
of right and justice which the guarantee of due process
in the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to preserve."
In the ca,se of l\luller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, the
court sustained an act of the Oregon legislature prohibiting
the employment of women in any mechanical establishment,
or factory or laundry more than ten hours during any one
day.
The court, in its opinion, observed that limitations upon
hours of labor in the employment of women and children
are quite general, and at Page 420 and 421 said:
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"Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled
by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is
the peculiar value of a written constitution that it places
in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action,
and thus gives a permanence and stability to popular
government which otherwise would be lacking. At the
same time, when a question of fact is debated and debatable, and the extent to which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect
to that fact, a widespread and long continued belief concerning it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial
cognizance of all matters of general knowledge."
Probably the ultimate test in determining whether a
statute enacted under the police power violates the constitutional guarantees, is the experience, the conscience, and
the good sense of the judges. Precedent is seldom available
in any given case, and the purposes of the legislature are
in most cases matters of either presumption or conjecture.
In the case of In re. l\:lorgan (Colo.) 58 Pac. 1071,
the Colorado Court held that a statute making it unlawful
to work more than eight hours per day in mines and smelters, was in violation of the state constitution guaranteeing
liberty and the right to acquire, possess and protect property. The Colorado Court considered the Holden cases,
supra, and in its opinion said:
"If, in our constitution there was, as there seems
to be in that of Utah, a specific affirmative provision
enjoining upon the general assembly the enactment of
laws to protect the health of the classes of workmen
therein enumerated, it might be that acts, reasonably
appropriate to that end, would not be obnoxious to that
provision of our constitution forbidding class regulation, for it could hardly be said that a classification
made by the constitution itself was arbitrary or unfair
or that it clashed with another provision of the same
instrument inhibiting class regulation."
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But the present act, if it applies to plaintiffs' employees,
does not come within the classification required by our constitution to be given special protection. As heretofore
pointed out, plaintiffs are not engaged in mining; and the
only classifications mentioned in Section 6 of Article 16 are
employees in factories, smelters and mines.
If any presumptions arise from the language in Section 6 of Article 16, it is that the legislature should provide
for the health and safety of the employees in factories,
smelters and mines and for no others.
Certain it is, that as to other employments, there is
no blanket authority given for their regulation such as the
constitution provides for employees in factories, smelters
and mines. As to other employments, the court should at
least be satisfied that the legislature has deliberately considered the same; has considered the necessity of extending
such police measures to them and determined upon a factual
basis that regulation is necessary.
We look in vain, to find any legislative declaration that
employment in a tunnel such as plaintiffs are digging is
injurious to the health and safety of workmen therein. The
legislature has failed to indicate that in its judgment such
occupation requires such regulation.
The Supreme Court of this state found ample authority
in Section 6, Article 16 of the constitution for reasonable
regulation with respect to employees in factories, smelters
and mines. At least this court, before subjecting plaintiffs
to the penal statute in question, should require more than
the bald limitation of hours as to plaintiffs' employees.
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cept their wrongful claim to jurisdiction for enforcement
of the statute.
Defendants admit that the tunnel has for its only purpose the conveyance of water; that it is being worked from
both portals; will be, when completed, 15,000 feet in length
and 7 feet in diameter. That it is not a mine or connected
with any mining enterprise; that there are no stopes, drifts
or shafts, but that the tunnel is a straight bore and will be
lined and reinforced with concrete and steel.
Considering the facts in this case, the size of the tunnel,
the fact that it is straight, that there are no drifts, no shafts,
no stopes; that there are no holes in which foul air may
accumulate or in which men must work, can the court say
that there is any reasonable or valid basis in fact to warrant the extension to plaintiffs' workings of the regulation
limiting the period of employment in underground mines?
No public purpose, with respect to such industry, has
been commanded in the constitution. The legislature has
made no finding of that necessity, has never declared that
such workings are dangerous or unhealthy.
Do the facts known to the court fit the language of the
Nevada Court in Ex parte Boyce, supra .... "We may
consider the protection of the health and lives .of that large
portion of the people in this state who delve in the earth
in search of precious metals .... and who the,re, come in
contact with poisonous minerals and breathe dust, foul air
and obnoxious fumes and gases?"
Do the facts before this court make the language of the
Missouri Court in State v. Cantwell, supra, appropriate to
this tunnel .... ? "The legislature doubtless realized the
necessity of the provisions of this act being made applicable
to those in search of minerals. The operations of mines
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is a permanent business, lasting frequently for many years.
On the other hand, the digging of a well or the running of a
tunnel is not to be classed as a business, it is work that is
completed in a comparatively short time
Can this court fail to say that the conditions in plaintiffs' workings are so different from those in underground
mines -the public necessity so lacking - that to apply
the limitation on hours of labor justified in the latter to the
former is arbitrary, unreasonable and void?' The court will
take judicial notice that mining in this state constitutes a
major industry. The court will likewise take judicial notice
that the digging of a tunnel such as the one now under
consideration is the exceptional, the unusual thing ..
Unless the court entertains the view that the legislative declaration is conclusive evidence of the constitutionality of its action, it must construe this statute as having
no application to plaintiffs.
But there is a further reason why we believe this act
can not be upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.
Suppose the act in question limited the period of em..
ployment in all underground mines or workings to four
hours in each twenty-four. Unless the court is willing to
say that the law is constitutional because the legislature
passed it, it could not be sustained. The court would undoubtedly see in such legislation a capricious, arbitrary
and unreasonable limitation on the constitutional rights of
plaintiffs.
The act in question requiring that:
&

••• ''

"Such eight hour period shall be computed from
the time men go under ground until they return to the
surface," is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation
to any legitimate end within the legislative power.
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The legislature has not pretended to determine that
the time used by workmen in going from the surface to
their place of work, and returning to the surface, is detrimental to the health or safety of such employees or against
the public welfare.
This act does not, as its title would indicate, fix a standard day's work of eight hours or of seven hours. The
period which constitutes a maximum day's labor is not declared by the act, but must be determined by subtracting a
variable period from eight hours. It does not declare the
period of time that workmen in such a tunnel may work.
It declares only, that they may labor not longer than the
difference between eight hours and the time used in going
into and coming out of said tunnel. The employee working
at the entrance of this tunnel may work eight hours, while
one employed at a point far distant from the entrance may
be prohibited from working in excess of 4, 5, 6 or 7 hours,
depending on the time consumed in traversing the course
from the surface to his place of work and returning therefrom.
The court will take judicial notice that the employees
are not working while coursing this distance; that whether
they walk or ride in on flat cars, they are not subjected to
that fatigue and exhaustion which alone justifies such legislation.
This court, in the Holden Cases, supra, could not have
had in mind the time consumed in coursing such a tunnel
when it said:
"The law in question is confined to the protection
of that class of people engaged in labor in underground
mines," and, "if men engaged in underground mining
are liable to be injured in their health or otherwise, by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
too many hours labor each day, a law to protect them
should be aimed at that wrong."
The constitution requires the legislature to pass laws
to provide for the health and safety of employees in factories, smelters and mines. The 1937 act still permits working men in smelters and reduction and refining plants to
work eight hours per day, but limits the time a man may
work in underground mines or workings to a shorter period.
The constitution made no classification in favor of employees in underground mines. The legislature has by implication created a classification favoring such employees.
The act in question is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, it arbitrarily furthers the interest of a particular class
of employees.
Unless this court would sustain a law which computed
the eight hour period from the time such workmen left
home until they returned to their homes, or from the time
they reached the employer's premises until they left the
premises, the court can not find legal justification for this
act.
In terms of its lowest denomination, this act is a shorter
than eight hour law. It may be seven hours and fifty minutes per day, seven hours and thirty minutes per day, seven
hours per day, six hours per day, five hours per day or
four hours per day, depending on the variable period required or used in travelling underground and in returning
to the surlace.
Statutes limiting hours of labor in undertakings carried on by the state are upheld not as an exercise of the
police power, but as an assertion by the state of its right to
regulate conditions upon which its work will be done.
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Statutes regulating hours of labor of women have been
sustained upon the ground of natural or assumed disabilities
of the so-called weaker sex.
Statutes regulating hours of labor in dangerous or unhealthful industries have been sustained as a protection to
health and safety of such laborers.
But if the statute imposing such regulation has no real
or substantial relation to the objects justifying it, or is
a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge and thereby
give effect to the constitution. State v. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah, 500, 510.
The statute in question is denoted a labor law. It purports to declare what constitutes a day's work. Nothing
outside the act is required to show the fallacy and the unreasonableness of the limitation contained in the act. This
act fixes a period of less than eight hours as a day's work
in underground mines and workings. No shorter than an
eight hour day applies to smelters and factories. A day of
less than eight hours has no reasonable relation to the
health and safety of employees or to the public welfare.
It is not inconceivable that this act may well constitute
a complete prohibition of labor in certain underground mines
or workings; it is certain that in every case it will constitute a varying limitation upon the hours of labor ranging
in periods from eight hours to a complete prohibition.
The court must, in every case presented, hold the legislative egg claimed to be sustained under the state's police
power before the candle of the constitutional guarantees,
and determine whether the legislative enactment constitutes
a legitimate exercise of the police power, or is merely
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
meddlesome interference with business or the right to bargain for services.
The court must look beyond form to substance. The
act in question is not a labor act-it is an exemption from
the labor act. It is a legislative fiat that that which is not
labor shall be called labor and paid for as labor. It is
unreasonable and unwarranted interference with plaintiffs'
right to secure eight hours of labor instead of securing only
four or six or seven hours' labor, labelled by the legislative
meddling, as eight hours. This act certainly singles out
that class of employers operating underground mines or
workings, and infringes their constitutional rights by extending special consideration to their employees not extended to any other class of employees within the state, and
without any apparent or justifiable reason for so doing.
It is a legislative attempt to reclassify the classification
named in the constitution "employees in factories, smelters
and mines," without apparent reason or justification and
in a manner entirely arbitrary and capricious.
It certainly singles out that class of employees who
work in underground mines or workings for special consideration and discriminates against employers of such labor.
In Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah 495, 499; 151 Pac. 51,
this court said:
"If there be one thing more than others to be
guarded against encroachment it is the federal and
state Constitutions. These we are all sworn to protect and defend. To disobey them is to jeopardize fundamental rights and liberties of the people, imperil their
welfare and happiness, and to menace the very existence of governments."

In the case of State v. Henry, (N. Mex.) 25 Pac. 2nd
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ing the working of male employees in mercantile establishments more than eight hours a day, or 48 hours in a week
of six days. The court reviewed the authorities and said:
"The statute before us bears no evidence of a legislative purpose by it to safeguard health, morals, or
safety. No claims are here made that it was so intended or will so result. Facts of which we may take
judicial notice, and none other are before us, do not
argue, and we are unable to concede, that the health,
morals, or safety of the general public or of the class
regulated are at all involved in the sustaining or the
overthrow of the act; or that there is involved any
other specific object for which we have become accustomed to some yielding of the principles of personal
liberty and of private property."
In the case of Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, (S. C.) 2 S. E.
2nd 36, decided March 1939, the statute prohibited the employment of employees of enumerated manufacturing and
mercantile establishments for more than 56 hours per week
or 12 hours per day.
Plaintiffs, as employers affected by the limitation on
hours of labor, brought injunction against the Commissioner
of Labor to prevent the enforcement of the act. The court
held:
1. That the act deprived plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, and denied them the
equal protection of the law.
In the course of its opinion, the court said:
"Neither counsel for the plaintiffs nor the Commissioner of Labor have cited to the Court any decision where any court has ever held valid a regulation
of the hours of labor of all employees within a State, ...
"Many other Courts have similarly held that the
general regulation of the hours of labor in private industry in which the Court can see no direct relation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
to the public health, welfare or morals, is not a proper
exercise of the police power and must be held invalid
as in violation of the constitutional protection of the
individual ....
"It is also worthy of note that there are no real
recitations in this Act indicating that it was passed
upon any theory that work for more than fifty-six hours
in any week was injurious to the health or dangerous
to the life of the employees. Nor is there anything in
the Act indicating a purpose to relieve unemployment.
Nor is there anything showing a purpose to protect the
public from any evil results of longer hours of work.
"The Court cannot conclude that it is dangerous
to the health or safety of the employees or the public
for an employee to work more than fifty-six hours in
any one week in all of the manufacturing and mercantile establishments covered by the terms of the Act ....
"It is true that the Legislature has the power in
passing a law to make a classification of its citizens
and the constitutional provisions are not violated by
such classification if the law as passed is applicable
alike to all persons of the given class, but the Courts of
the State and of the United States have always held
that such classification cannot be made arbitrarily, but
must rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the Act in which the classification was proposed .•..
" 'Equality in right, privilege, burdens and protection is the thought running through the Constitution
and laws of the state; and an act intentionally and necessarily creating inequality therein, based on no reason
suggested by necessity or difference in condition or circumstances, is opposed to the spirit of free gover!lment,
and expressly prohibited by the Constitution.'
"'A law is not constitutional if it confers particular privileges, or imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions in the exercise of a common right upon
a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general
body of those that stand in the same relation to the subject of the law. The Legislature may classify, for the
purpose of legislation, if some intrinsic reason exists
why the law should operate upon some and not upon all,
or should affect some differently from others, but this
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classification must be based upon differences which are
either defined by the Constitution, or are natural or
intrinsic, and which suggest a reason that may rationally be held to justify the diversity in the legislation. It
must not be arbitrary, for the mere purpose of classification. The clause must be characterized by some substantial qualities or attributes, which render such legislation necessary or appropriate for the individuals of
the class.'
"It is also true that the right of the Legislature to
classify is much broader in the field of taxation than
it is in criminal statutes such as this."
The South Carolina Court found that the classifications
upon which exemptions were based were arbitrary and without reasonable basis, and observed:
" .... There would seem to be no reason why a
truck driver for a laundry should be exempt. while a
truck driver for a dry cleaning plant should be regulated. There would seem to be no reason why brick
and tile works should be regulated and employees of
saw mills, turpentine plants and logging industries
should be exempt. Cotton gins and oil mills are not as
healthful places of employment as book stores or filling stations, yet the gins and oil mills are exempt while
the book stores and filling stations are regulated ....
the court cannot say that the industries included ·within
the provisions of the Act are of such a character as to
justify the Legislature in saying that work in these industries for more than fifty-six hours per week jeopardizes the health of the employee, while work for more
than fifty-six hours in the exempted businesses does
not."
The North Carolina Court did not surrender its judgment and its knowledge of facts or public opinion to the
legislative branch. We submit that the classification in
favor of employees in underground mines or workings is as
arbitrary as those in the statute of North Carolina, and
also reclassifies what the Constitution has already classified.
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In Adair v. U.S., 208 U.
court said:

S~

161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 280 the

"The right of a person to sell his labor upon such
terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same
as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the
conditions upon which he will accept such labor from
the person offering to sell .... In all such particulars~
the employer and the employee have equality of. right,.
and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract
which no government can legally justify in a free land"
Does not the Act now before the Court db exactly what
the Adair case, supra, said might not be done?
In United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312,
318 the Supreme Court used this language:
"When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in tfie courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the government
has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged
and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its
considered judgment upon the question. The only
power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of
judgment. This court neither approves nor condemns
any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office
is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is
in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions- of the Constitution; and, having done that, its
duty ends."
When the court lays the Constitution beside this statute, does the statute square with the constitution? Is the
Act-computing as a part of the eight hour period time
when the employee· is :not working~for the health- or safety
of the employee? Is it for the peace, health, safety or welfare of the state? Does it combat unemployment by in'creasing employment?
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Is the limitation on the hours of labor of plaintiffs' employees incidental to the welfare of the state, or is said
limitation the ultimate end?
If the Court, by laying the Constitution beside the Statute, can see in said legislation only the extension of special
privileges to employees in underground mines or workings,
then the act must be held invalid.
We respectfully submit that the Act in question has no
application to plaintiffs' employees, and as applied to plaintiffs is unconstitutional and void. The writ should be made
permanent.
Respectfully submitted,
GEO. W. WORTHEN,
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
APPENDIX
" EXHIBIT I "
No. 6221
(Title of Court and Cause)
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROIDBITION
Plaintiffs complain of defendants and respectfully petition this Honorable Court for a writ of prohibition and
allege as follows, to-wit:
I.

That petitioners are co-partners doing business under the firm name and style of Thompson-Markham Company and that petitioners have complied with the laws of
the State of Utah with respect to obtaining a license as
contractor and have obtained from the Department of RegSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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istration of the State of Utah a license to engage in business
in the State of Utah as contractors.

IT.
That heretofore plaintiffs entered into a contract in
writing with the United States of America, Department of
Interior, Bureau of Reclamation for the construction by
plaintiffs of two certain tunnels known as Olmsted and
Alpine-Draper Tunnels, Salt Lake Aqueduct, in connection
with and as part of a project known as the Deer Creek
Project, having for its purpose the conveyance and transportation of water from the Deer Creek Reservoir on
Provo River in Utah County, State of Utah, for use by
subscribers of said water in Salt Lake· County, State of
Utah.

m.
That plaintiffs are now engaged in the execution of
said contract and particularly engaged in the construction
of that part of said project known as the Alpine-Draper
Tunnel; and that under the said contract and the plans
and specifications therefor, said tunnel runs from a point
in the vicinity of Alpine, Utah County, State of Utah, to
a point in the vicinity of Draper, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and projects through the elevation separating said
two above-named points, and said tunnel proceeds and will
be constructed when completed at a grade of four feet per
mile and will have when completed a length of approximately 15,000 feet; that said tunnel so being constructed
is approximately seven feet in diameter and is being supported and will be supported when completed with steel ribs
from two feet to six feet apart, and is to be lined and reinforced with concrete.
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IV.
That said work is being prosecuted with two separate
crews of laborers or workmen, one operating from the
Alpine portal and one operating from the Draper portal,
the present total number of workmen engaged being in
excess of seventy individuals, approximately forty-eight of
said workmen working inside the tunnel, and which said
workmen and laborers consist in the main of drillers, machine men, timber men, carpenters, cement men, mucking
machine tenders, common laborers and foremen.

v.
The minimum wages to be paid by plaintiffs to said
employees are fixed by the terms and provisions of said
contract, with which wage scale plaintiffs are complying,
and said contract requires that plaintiffs shall fully complete said work within 650 calendar days from the date of
receipt of notice to said contractors to commence work,
said notice having been given to plaintiffs December 30,
1938; and that by the terms and provisions of said agreement heavy penalties by way of liquidated damages and
provisions for forfeiture and termination of said agreement
are provided to be imposed against plaintiffs in the event
of failure to prosecute said work according to schedule and
for failure to complete the same within the time specified.
VI.

That said defendant The Industrial Commission of
Utah is a commission of the State of Utah, designated by
statute, and that said defendant William M. Knerr is the
chairman of said commission and that said defendants William M. Knerr, 0. F. McShane, and Frank A. Jugler are the
members thereof; that the defendant E. A. Hodges is the
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duly appointed and acting State Metal Mine Inspector and
an employee of defendant The Industrial Commission of
Utah.
VII.

That in the prosecution of said project there is no shaft
constructed or to be constructed in connection therewith,
and that it is not the purpose of plaintiffs or of the United
States of America, Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Reclamation, or of the employees of plaintiffs to explore for
or discover mineral values or to develop or operate a mine
or smelter in connection with said project, but only to drive
a straight tunnel to be used only for the water as herein
alleged.
VIII.

That in the prosecution of the work to be performed
under said contract, said tunnel is equipped with electric
lights and the workmen and laborers therein are provided
with fresh air by means of mechanical devices provided by
plaintiffs. That there are no stopes, drifts, depressions or
elevation where impure air can accumulate, and that
through said mechanical devices all gas, smoke and impure
air are drawn by suction pumps to the outside and pure
air is blown to the headings within said tunnel and distributed throughout the same, and that said defendants
have not at any time or at all by general or special order
found that said place of employment is unsafe or injurious
to the welfare of said employees, nor has any complaint
been made by any person to said defendants that said place
of employment is unsafe or injurious to the welfare of said
or any employee or employees of said plaintiffs.
IX.

That said defendants, and each of them, wrongfully·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
and unlawfully claim and contend that they have jurisdiction over the operations of plaintiffs under the terms
and provisions of said contract by virtue of the provisions
of Section 49-3-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as
amended by Chapter 59 of the Laws of Utah, 1937, with
reference to the hours of labor as constituting a days' work
as applied to the prosecution of said project.
X.
That heretofore said defendants have notified plaintiffs that it is unlawful for plaintiffs to require or permit
their said workmen to work eight hours per day at the
place of employment within said tunnel, and that the period of employment of all of the said employees shall be
not more than eight hours per day, computed from the
time when said employees enter the portal of said tunnel
until they return to the entrance thereof, and that it is unlawful for plaintiffs to require or permit their said employees to work more than eight hours each day from the
time when said employees enter the portal of said tunnel
until they return to the entrance thereof.
XI.

That in the prosecution of said work plaintiffs have required their said employees to work eight hours per day
at their place of employment within said tunnel, and to
change shifts at the place of employment within said tunnel
and not at the portal of said tunnel, and that in computing
the said eight-hour period per day the time consumed to
going from the portal to the place of employment and returning therefrom to the portal of said tunnel is not computed, all of which is in conformity with the agreement of
said plaintiffs with their said employees.
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XII.

That said defendants have notified plaintiffs that unless plaintiffs shall cease and desist from requiring or permitting their said employees to work eight hours per day
at the place of employment within said tunnel, and unless
plaintiffs shall require their said employees to work not to
exceed eight hours per day from the time they enter the
portal of said tunnel until they return to the entrance thereof, the defendants will institute criminal proceedings against
plaintiffs alleging violation by plaintiffs of Section 49-3-2,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended by Chapter 59,
Laws of Utah, 1937, by requiring plaintiffs' employees to
work more than eight hours per day from the time said
employees enter the portal of said tunnel until they return
to the entrance thereof; that defendants have notified
plaintiffs that such criminal proceedings will be instituted
and prosecuted covering each of plaintiffs' employees for
each day that any of said employees are permitted or required to work more than eight hours from the time said
employees enter said tunnel until they return to the entrance thereof.
That defendants wrongfully and unlawfully claim and
assert that they have jurisdiction to administer and enforce
the provisions of Section 49-3-2, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, as amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937,
against the plaintiffs, and defendants wrongfully and unlawfully claim and assert that they have jurisdiction by and
through the use of such criminal proceedings to compel
plaintiffs to comply with the provisions of said Section 493-2, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, by permitting and requiring
their said employees to work not more than eight hours
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from the time said employees enter said tunnel until they
return to the entrance thereof. That the terms and provisions of said section of the statute as amended as aforesaid has no applicability to plaintiffs and/or their employees, and that said defendants are without jurisdiction to
enforce or administer the terms or provisions thereof as
against plaintiffs and/or their employees, and defendants
are without jurisdiction to regulate in any manner the
hours of labor on the project hereinbefore described, or to
require plaintiffs to demand that their employees work not
more than eight hours from the time they enter said tunnel
until they return to the entrance thereof.
That in the event said defendants shall carry out their
said threats and institute said numerous and vexatious
suits and proceedings, said plaintiffs will be caused great
expense and annoyance and greatly hampered and impaired
in the prosecution of their said project, with the possibility
of delay, damage and forfeiture under the terms and provisions thereof.
XIII.
That by reason of the multiplicity of suits threatened
to be and which will be instituted against plaintiffs by said
defendants in the event they be not prohibited and restraine.d by this Court, and by reason of the period of time
consumed and which will be consumed in the hearing of
said numerous actions and the appeals therefrom to the
district courts and to this Court, that a remedy by appeal
from said actions will be .and is inadequate as a remedy for
plaintiffs, and plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that an alternative writ
of prohibition issue from this Court requiring said defendants, and each of them, immediately to desist and refrain
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from instituting any proceedings, criminal or otherwise,
against plaintiffs, or either of them, by reason of the hours
of employment required or permitted to be served or engaged in by the employees of plaintiffs upon said project,
and to immediately cease and desist asserting, claiming, or
assuming any jurisdiction whatsoever over plaintiffs and/or
their said employees upon said project in the prosecution
of said work with respect to the hours of labor permitted
or required by plaintiffs from their said employees in connection with said project under the terms and provisions of
said statute, to which reference is herein made; and that
said defendants, and each of them, be required to show
cause before this Honorable Court why said alternative
writ should not be made permanent; and that said defendants, and each of them, be required to show cause at a
time to be fixed by this Court why they should not be permanently prohibited from proceeding in any way, by criminal proceedings or otherwise, from enforcing the terms and
provisions of said Section 49-3-2, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, as amended by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah, 1937, as
against plaintiffs and their said employees in the prosecution of their contract with the United States of America
for the construction of said tunnel, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, for the construction of said
tunnel; and plaintiffs pray further for such other relief as
may seem proper, and for their costs herein incurred.
GEO. W. WORTHEN,
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
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STATE OF UTAH,

}

ss.

COUNTY OF UTAH.
GEORGE K. THOMPSON, being first duly sworn on
oath, deposes and says:
That he is one of the plaintiffs in the above entitled
action; that he has read the above and foregoing Petition
for Writ of Prohibition; that he knows and understands the
contents thereof and that the statements therein contained
are true to his best knowledge, information and belief.
GEORGE K. THOMPSON
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of
January, A. D. 1940.
GEO. W. WORTHEN,
(Seal)
Notary Public
Residing at Provo, Utah.
My commission expires Dec. 8, 1941.
" EXHIBIT 2 "
(Title of Court and Cause)
ANSWER
COME NOW the above named defendants and in answer to the Petition for Writ of Prohibition filed herein
admit, deny and allege as follows:
I.

These defendants admit the allegations contained in
Paragraph 1 of said Petition.
II.
These defendants admit the allegations contained in
Paragraph 2 of said Petition.
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m.
These defendants admit the allegations contained in
Paragraph 3 of said Petition.
IV.

These defendants admit the allegations contained in
Paragraph 4 of said Petition.

v.
In answer to Paragraph 5 of said Petition these
defendants admit the allegations therein contained, but allege that said allegations are not material to the issues
involved in this case.

VI.

These defendants admit the allegations contained in
Paragraph 6 of said Petition.
VII.

These defendants admit the allegations contained in
Paragraph 7 of said Petition.
VITI.
In answer to Paragraph 8 of said Petition, these

defendants admit that the tunnel therein mentioned is
equipped with electric lights and that fresh air is forced
into the tunnel by means of mechanical devices and admits
there are no stopes, drifts or shafts in said tunnel, but denies that by reason of said mechanical devices all gas, smoke
and impure air are drawn out of said tunnel. These defendants admit that they have made no general or special
order to the effect that the employment of men is unsafe
or injurious to the welfare of said employees. These defendants admit that no complaint has been made to these
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jurious to the welfare of the employees working therein.
That in further answer to said Paragraph 8, these defend·
ants allege that the said tunnel is equipped with modern
equipment for the purpose of removing the gas, smoke and
impure air from said tunnel, but deny that by reason thereof all of such gas, smoke and impure air is removed, although every effort is being made by the plaintiffs to keep
the said tunnel as clear of impure air as can reasonably be
done.
IX.
In answer to Paragraph 9 of said Petition these
defendants admit that they claim to have jurisdiction over
the operations of plaintiffs by virtue of the section of the
law therein referred to, but deny that they wrongfully make
such claim. In further answer to said Paragraph 9 these
defendants allege that it is their duty under the law of this
State to supervise every employment and place of employment and to enforce the laws for the protection of the life,
health, safety and welfare of all employees, and to institute such civil actions as may be necessary to accomplish
such purposes and to request the prosecution of criminal
actions to enforce such purposes.
X.

In answer to Paragraph 10 of said Petition these
defendants admit the allegations therein contained.

XI.
In answer to Paragraph 11, these defendants admit that plaintiffs have required their employees to work
eight hours per day at the place of employment in said
tunnel and to change shifts at the place of employment
within said tunnel and not at the portal thereof, and that
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in computing the said eight hour period per day, the time

consumed in going from the portal to the place of employment and returning therefrom to the portal is not computed. These defendants, however, have no information
relating to the agreements between plaintiffs and their employees with respect to such matters.
XII.
In answer to Paragraph 12 of said Petition these
defendants admit that they have notified plaintiffs that unless they cease and desist from requiring said employees
to work more than eight hours per day, the said hours to
be computed from the time that they go underground until
they return to the surface, that they will request that criminal proceedings be taken against plaintiffs, by swearing to
complaints, in accordance with the laws of this State relating to such matters, and that such criminal proceedings
will be instituted whenever plaintiffs violate the laws of
this State, relating to such employment, by requesting criminal complaints, or by otherwise commencing civil actions.
These defendants admit that they claim and assert that
they have jurisdiction to administer and enforce the provisions of the law referred to in said Paragraph 11, and
other provisions of law relating to the employment of labor,
and that under the laws of this State relating to the employment of labor in all underground workings, it is the
duty of these defendants to see that such laws are complied
with, but deny that they make such claims and assertions
unlawfully and without authority, and deny that the sec-·
tions of law referred to in said paragraph did not apply to
plaintiffs, but on the contrary, allege that the mining operations carried on by plaintiffs comes within the provisions
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of the law of this State relating to underground mining
operations.
XIII.
In answer to Paragraph 13 of said Petition these
defendants admit that there would be a multiplicity of suits,
unless prohibited by this Court, started against plaintiffs,
unless they refrain from working their said employees more
than eight hours underground. Further answering said
Petition and as a further defense thereto, these defendants
allege that the tunnel now being driven by plaintiffs is an
underground workings built and constructed for the purpose of conveying water. That the methods used in constructing said tunnel are very similar to those used by mining companies in the construction of tunnels and other
underground workings. That the rocks are broken by the
use of powder, and the muck is removed by the use of men
or machinery. That fresh air is forced into the tunnel by
use of "blowers," and the bad air is drawn from the tunnel
by reversing the "blowers." That like all tunnels in this
mountainous country, water is encountered in the tunnel
driven by the plaintiffs, and that the air in the said tunnel,
like all other underground workings within this mountainous country, is cold and damp, containing at times powder
smoke and other gases which cannot be entirely removed
from the tunnel even by the use of the most modern methods now in use, and in this connection, these defendants
allege that the tunnel being driven by plaintiffs is equipped
with the most modern of such methods, in the same way
that tunnels being driven in this State for mining purposes
are equipped.
WHEREFORE, THESE DEFENDANTS PRAY that
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the temporary Writ issued herein be dissolved, and that the
Court refuse to make the Writ permanent, and that these
defendants be awarded their costs.
JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General of Utah
By S. D. HUFFAKER,
Assistant Attorney General
STATE OF UTAH,

}

ss.

COUNTY OF UTAH,
0. F. McShane, being duly sworn, deposes and says
that he is one of the defendants above named; that he
makes this verification on behalf of himself and the
other defendants; that he has read the above Answer
and knows the contents thereof, and that the same are
true of his own knowledge, except as to matters alleged on information and belief, and as to such matters
he believes them to be true.

(SIGNED) 0. F. McSHANE
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day
of February, 1940.
C. I. SMITH,
Notary Public residing at
Salt Lake City, Utah
My commision expires:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

